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Abstract 
The main goal of this thesis is to assess and identify the main drivers of entry mode choice in 
international M&A. Three main direct factors (Cultural distance; acquirer R&D intensity and 
industry relatedness) and one indirect (Previous Acquisition Experience as a moderator of the 
effect of cultural distance in full acquisition probability) were derived. By using a sample of 
496 US-based deals from 1995 to 2018, findings suggest that cultural distance between the 
acquirer and target firms and R&D intensity of the acquirer are relevant to the decision between 
opting for a full acquisition or a partial one. Nevertheless, it was not possible to achieve 
significance regarding the industry relatedness effect and the moderator effect of previous 
experience. 
Key Words: M&A; Entry mode choice; Full Acquisition; Partial Acquisition; Cultural 
Distance; R&D intensity; Acquisition Experience. 
 
I. Introduction 
In the modern world, internationalization is seen as a critic component of firms’ growth 
opportunities. Moreover, firms can achieve internationalization through different approaches, 
including exports, licensing and Foreign Direct Investments (henceforth FDIs) or Mergers and 
Acquisitions (hence M&A) (Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998). Regarding the latter, M&A is 
indeed a key part of companies’ growth strategies. Undeniably, as market openness and 
competition increases, more and more attrition is put to the firms organic growth strategies, 
leading to an increased focus on non-organic growth methods. According to Financial Times, 
in the first nine months of 2018, a record has been set for global M&A activity, surpassing the 
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previous peak of pre-financial crisis, with deals summing up to almost $3.3 trillion, which 
represents a 39 per cent increase from 2017 (Financial Times, 2018. Source: Thomson Reuters). 
One of the key aspects of an M&A deal is the entry mode choice. Studies regarding this subject 
have shown that entry modes, once established, are difficult to change or correct, suggesting 
long-term consequences for the firm (Pedersen, Petersen and Benito, 2002). In fact, companies 
have numerous means at their disposal to enter a new market. Enterprises can form joint 
ventures with local partners by splitting ownership of new entities with them (greenfield joint 
ventures) or taking over partial equity of existing firms from them (acquisition joint ventures) 
(Chen and Hennart, 2004). Firms also face a choice regarding how much stake of the target 
company should they buy, as they need to opt for a partial or full acquisition. 
This thesis focus on the latter strategic decision, aiming to identify the key aspects that lead to 
the choice of a full versus a partial acquisition, taking as sample foreign acquisitions of United 
States (hence US) based companies in designated sectors. Therefore, I analyzed existing 
literature on M&A entry mode choice, with increased focus in Cultural Distance and Research 
and Development (henceforth R&D) topics, although not overlooking other key aspects proven 
before to be decisive in this decision-making process, such as previous experience and firm 
size. Moreover, my Research Question was formulated as if Cultural Distance of the 
home/target countries and R&D Intensity of the home firm influence the entry mode choice, 
with entry mode choice defined as a binomial variable with two states: Full Acquisition (over 
50% stake) and Partial Acquisition (less than 50% stake). Research on same industry 
acquisitions and experience as a moderating effect of cultural distance was also conducted. 
Although a research around the choice of Greenfield/Acquisitions and Acquisitions/Joint 
Ventures may also seem interesting, there was no such available data to it, which confined my 
research to purely full acquisition against partial acquisition. 
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The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. Section II yields a literature review on the 
drivers of entry mode choice. In Section III a description of the model and methodology is 
made, emphasizing on sample specificities and variable construction. Afterwards, Section IV 
provides discussions and conclusions overview. 
II. Literature Review 
Regarding the subject of M&A, literature about the entry mode choice is vast, although 
somewhat contradictory. Moreover, besides de choice of a Greenfield investment or an 
acquisition over an existing company, firms must choose the amount of acquiring stake that 
maximizes their potential profits, based on their assets, capabilities and growth strategy. 
Although there are many theories that explain why a company opts for a greenfield joint-venture 
as opposed to a wholly owned greenfield investment, such as lower transaction costs (Hennart, 
1988) or risk sharing (Harrigan, 1988) so that it can extract the benefits of having a local partner, 
these do not explain why firms in their process of internationalization still concur in partial 
acquisitions of existing companies.  
 
Cultural Distance 
One of the key topics regarding the entry mode choice is the cultural difference of the target 
and home countries, and its possibility to create major obstacles in order to achieve integration 
benefits (Stahl and Voigt, 2008). Differences in national cultures have been shown to result in 
different organizational and administrative practices and employee expectations (Kogut and 
Singh, 1988). As disparity between administrative and cultural practices, personal 
characteristics of the target and parent firms increases, so do post-acquisition costs increase 
(Jemison and Sitkin, 1986). Specifically, this occurs since executives find a more difficult 
environment to operate, as they are not comfortable and familiar with the approaches and 
6 
 
modus-operandi of the target firm, which will ultimately delay and create attrition to the transfer 
of management techniques and acquiring firm’s values (Richman and Copen, 1972). This can 
easily be mitigated by acquiring firms by leaving management positions to the local existing 
managers of the acquired firm, although this iteration leads to a lower degree of control.  
Literature on degree of control for international investments is vast, although it differs across 
analyzed markets, controlling for target and/or home markets, and how control is defined. 
Hennart and Larimo (1998), by performing a study on how national origin affects the entry 
mode choice of companies entering the US conclude that higher cultural distance leads to higher 
propensity to enter US through joint ventures, and subsequently, less control. Gatignon and 
Anderson (1988) find similar results for foreign investments of US firms, although they 
classified cultural distance according to clusters of countries and control was measured not only 
with the acquiring stake, but also with the effective number of partners adjudicated in the 
subsidiary board. 
 
Although conflicting literature arises arguing that for higher levels of cultural difference, 
companies tend to impose higher control levels (Anand and Delios, 1997; Padmanabhan and 
Cho, 1996), these two studies were performed around companies based in Japan, as opposed to 
the studies mentioned before. Nevertheless, and in coherence with my sample of analysis, I 
derived the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: As cultural difference increases, investing companies should be less likely to 
choose full over partial acquisitions. In other words, as cultural difference increases, the 
probability of a full acquisition to be undertaken should decrease. 
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R&D intensity of the acquiring firm 
R&D is the creative work undertaken in order to increase the stock of knowledge and the use 
of this knowledge to devise new applications (OECD (2012), Main Science and Technology 
Indicators, OECD Publishing). In specific sectors, R&D spending and R&D intensity are critic 
determinants of performance (Franko, 1989; Kotabe, Srinivasan, and Aulakh, 2002), which can 
lead into an important competitive advantage over foreign companies (Hennart and Park, 1993). 
Once more, literature regarding the analysis of R&D intensity effects on entry mode and control 
choice is vast. According to Hennart and Park (1993), R&D-intensive investors are more likely 
to undertake a greenfield investment over an acquisition, since it is then possible for the 
investing company to better shape a management and labor force into its own culture and 
values. Moreover, Greenfields are a less risk option to maintain a higher control of the 
subsidiary. Oppositely, acquisitions are more desirable when investors wish to incorporate 
complementary inputs and/or technology they currently do not possess. It can also happen that 
investors are not confident that they have the necessary skills to run a subsidiary. In that case, 
by undergoing an acquisition, investors are also acquiring local management that already has 
the knowledge to operate in the local market. Several other studies regarding R&D intensity 
influence in the Greenfield/Acquisition choice show the same results, such as Andersson et al 
(1992) for Swedish firms; Brouthers and Brouthers (2001), based on 3 European countries and 
US firms; Kogut and Singh (1988) for firms entering the US and Cho and Padmanabhan (1995) 
in the case of Japanese firms. 
Using the same comparison as in the previous section, in which companies opt for a greenfield 
investment in order to retain more control, the following hypothesis was derived: 
Hypothesis 2: R&D intensity of the investing company should influence positively the 
probability of a full acquisition. 
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Related industries 
Adding to these, a key component of the entry mode decision making process is the similarity 
between buyer’s and target’s industries. In fact, transaction cost literature shows that acquiring 
firms prefer to conduct joint ventures over acquisitions when their target’s industry is less 
connected to their own, as their valuation might be less accurate, leading to increased 
transaction costs (Balakrishnan and Koza, 1993). Furthermore, when the desired assets of the 
target are not merged with other undesired assets, buyers will be encouraged towards 
acquisitions, leading to lower transaction costs. Logically, this will occur more when buyers 
are targeting firms in their own industry, as relatedness of assets and operations eases the 
acquisition and valuation of the target firm (Hennart, 1988). Chen and Hennart (2004) also 
found empirical evidence regarding this topic, as Japanese investors entering related industries 
are more propense to choose full over partial acquisitions. 
Hypothesis 3: If the target company is from a related industry of the acquiring one, the 
probability for a full acquisition should increase. 
 
Experience 
One of the major learning sources in organizations is experience (Penrose, 1959). Indeed, 
managers and workers possessing vast experience in a diverse set of environments present 
higher levels of productivity compared with workers without such experience (Walsh, 1995) 
Research also suggests that entry mode choice is influenced by the experience a company has 
regarding to acquisitions, either at as broad multinational acquisition experience or as local 
acquisition experience in the targeting market (Shimizu, Hitt, Vaidyanath and Pisano, 2004). 
Moreover, Barkema and Vermeulen (1998) defend that multinational diversity boosts the 
propensity for a firm to opt for a greenfield investment over an acquisition, as multinational 
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exposure develops higher technological capabilities and lowers innovation risk (Kogut, 1985). 
This leads to increasing levels of R&D, which in turn boosts the acquiring firm confidence and 
capacity to properly run and manage a foreign subsidiary (seen in section “R&D intensity of 
the acquiring firm”), regardless of their intrinsic characteristics, such as cultural distance to the 
buyer side. 
Specifically, as a firm tends to expand abroad and gain a vast set of capabilities, the risks of 
culture clash and inaccurate valuation of the target tend to diminish, since the company and its 
workers are better prepared/ possess the experience capabilities to mitigate these risks. Hence, 
I derived the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: If the target has previous experience in international acquisitions, the effect of 
Hypothesis 1 should be moderated. In other words, previous experience moderates the negative 
effect of cultural distance on propensity to fully acquire. 
A visual representation of the overall model can be seen below in figure 1. Red arrows indicate 
a negative effect on the probability of full acquisition, as green arrows represent a positive effect 
on said probability. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Visual representation of the model 
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III. Methodology 
Sample 
A sample of completed M&A deals was obtained via Thomson Reuters Eikon database. The 
sample is composed by completed deal entries of publicly listed companies based in the US, 
from the period of 1995 to November 2018. Deals with an acquiring stake smaller than 5%, 
reported deal size smaller than $5 Million or undisclosed stake/size were not considered. 
Moreover, for the year in which the transaction occurred, data on buyers’ number of employees, 
R&D expense and Sales had to be disclosed. This information was collected through 
Bloomberg. Since this research only cares for the initial acquisition stake, as its focus is solely 
on entry mode choice, further and additional acquisitions of the same firm by the same acquiring 
company were removed. Afterwards, entries were grouped by industry groups according to 
Bloomberg. For these, industries with less than 30 deals for the time span were not considered. 
Also, Food&Beverage; Machinery; Oil&Gas and Auto Parts&Equipments industries were not 
considered, in order to, first maintain industries with a desirable variance in R&D intensity, as 
in the case of Pharmaceuticals, and then, strict the analysis to similar industries. Thus, research 
was performed in the following industry groups: Computers; Electronics; Internet; 
Pharmaceuticals; Software and Telecommunications.  These restrictions were made in order to 
reduce noise in the sample and due to information availability. Final sample is composed of 
497 entries, of which 438 are full acquisitions and 59 are partial acquisitions. 
Due to easiness of readability, as different variables were put together through different 
procedures, the process of compiling information for the control variables will be explained in 
the section “Control Variables” below. 
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Dependent Variable 
The decision between full vs partial acquisitions is captured by a dummy variable that equals 
one if the home firm proceeded to a full acquisition or zero if they have opted for a partial one. 
In order to come up with a cut-off value, literature was consulted. Albeit most researches use a 
80% cutoff point (Gomes-Casseres, 1990; Hennart and Reddy, 1997), some researches adapt 
this cutoff point to better correspond to their main goals. Furthermore, when analyzing hostage 
effects theory, Chen and Hennart (2004) decided to increase the cutoff percentage to 95%, so 
that local sellers could not provide a sufficient hostage effect. Following this argument, and 
since control is being analyzed as solely the acquiring percentage, this research uses a cutoff of 
50%, as a stake above 50% gives full control to the acquiring company. Nevertheless, during 
the testing phase, various cutoff points were considered (50%; 80%; 95%), and all of them 
presented robust results. The final binomial logistic model is as follows: 
P(Yi =1) = 1 / [1 + exp( -α - Xi β)] 
Where P(Yi =1) estimates the probability of full acquisition for the ith observation, α is the 
intercept, Xi the vector of independent variables and β the vector of estimated parameters. 
Equation 1: Logistic model regression 
Independent variables 
Cultural Distance 
According to Kogut and Singh (1988) differences in culture among countries affect the 
awareness of managers and their capabilities to clearly identify the transaction costs, as their 
uncertainty regarding alternative entry modes increases. As in previous researches, this study 
uses the same approach of Kogut and Singh (1988), Hofstede’s 6-dimension model of national 
culture. Based on the indices from said model, an index was formed based on the deviations of 
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each cultural aspect of the target country from US’ own cultural scores. The model can be 
represented as follows: 
𝐶𝐷𝑗 = √∑(𝑆𝑖,𝑗 − 𝑆𝑖,𝑈𝑆)2 
Where CD: Cultural Distance; j: country; i: ith index of Hofstede model; S: Score 
Equation 2: Cultural Distance model 
Acquirer’s R&D intensity 
The R&D intensity of the acquirer was computed as the ratio between the reported R&D 
expenditure for the year in which the deal occurred and the reported Sales revenue for said year. 
These values were obtained through a Bloomberg terminal. 
𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 =
𝑅&𝐷 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
 
Equation 3: R&D intensity 
Similar industry acquisition 
Acquiring and acquired companies were grouped by industry following the criteria of 
Bloomberg’s “Industry Group”. Data was extracted via Bloomberg platform. This was made 
into a binomial variable that can take the value of “1” if the acquisition was made within the 
same industry group, or “0” otherwise. 
Previous Acquisition Experience 
Acquisition Experience was measured as the number of previous acquisitions a firm had made 
before the concurrent deal, in that country, for a timespan of 5 years. Data on firms’ acquisitions 
was collected and grouped, for each acquiring firm, by target country, target subregion, target 
region and simple international acquisition experience. Previous acquisition experience in 
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target’s country was selected as the independent variable since cultural distance is also defined 
for the same geographical measure. Moreover, after analysis on each criterion, country 
acquisition experience was the one with the best fitness to the model. 
 
Control variables 
So that non-desired effects were not captured by these variables, a set of control variables that 
have been proved in literature to influence control decisions were added to the model. 
Acquiring firm’s size influence on entry mode choice has been shown to be significant in 
various researches, with the argument that larger firms prefer and are more capable of choosing 
for full control (Gatignon and Anderson, 1998; Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1992; Brouthers and 
Brouthers, 2001). Following Gatignon and Anderson’s (1998) approach, this thesis used the 
total number of employees of the acquiring firm as the measure for the size of the firm. Data 
was collected through the Bloomberg platform. 
Regarding international acquisition experience, literature mostly believes that firms with 
greater experience prefer full control entry modes, as it has been argued that experience in 
international entry reduces the risk and cost of entry (Erramilli, 1991; Agarwal and 
Ramaswami, 1992). Firms achieve these reductions in risk and cost by developing systems for 
dealing with new market entries. This effect was measured as the number of previous 
acquisitions in the target’s country in the five-year time span before the deal occurred.  
At country level, three more control variables were added. First, bilateral trade between the 
acquiring and target’s countries was used as a proxy for the openness and mutual experience of 
both economies, as acquiring companies perceive less risks and are more confident to invest in 
markets for which they are more exposed. The variable was composed as the sum of exports 
and imports. Data was extracted from the US Census Bureau website, for the relevant years and 
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countries. Secondly, geographical distance was also included in the model. Distance was 
calculated with the help of the latitude and longitude coordinates of each countries capitals, 
compared to the US’. Thirdly, GDP per capita of the target country was added to the model, 
with data being acquired from the World Bank – World Development Indicators. 
Lastly, dummy variables were included to prevent for industry and time effects. The industry 
dummy variables were created according to the Bloomberg industry group criteria. Moreover, 
Telecommunications industry was used as the omitted dummy. Regarding time dummy 
variables, there were several years in the final sample that presented only full acquisition deals 
(2001; 2011-2013; 2016-2018).  
Moreover, since the dependent variable is a binomial variable, the regressions will be performed 
under a logistic model. It is then important to clarify the predicted coefficients interpretations. 
Under the model designed in Equation 1, the coefficients don’t represent the probability 
increase of opting for a full acquisition. In order to reach to said probability, it is needed to first 
derive the odds for a full acquisition, for each independent variable. This can be done by taking 
the exponential of the coefficient.  
𝑂𝑑𝑑𝑠 =  𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 
Equation 4: From coefficients to Odds 
Afterwards, Equation 5 can be utilized to derive the probabilities for each variable. 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 =  
𝑂𝑑𝑑𝑠
1 + 𝑂𝑑𝑑𝑠
 
Equation 5: From Odds to Probabilities 
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Results 
Results can be seen in Table 1 below. Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 2. Each 
Hypothesis was tested in a different model (Models 1 through 4 with Model 5 as the aggregate 
model) one at a time. 
In Hypothesis 1 it is predicted that cultural distance has an effect, with said effect having a 
negative impact on the probability of a firm opting for a full acquisition. As seen in Model 1, 
Cultural Distance has a negative statistically significant coefficient (p-value < 0,01). This 
coefficient means that for each unit increase in cultural difference, the odds of opting for a full 
acquisition decrease in exp(-0,0182)=0,98 times, (2% decrease in the odds). Odds can then be 
transformed into probabilities by simply using Equation 5. Conclusions are in line with 
previous studies (Kogut and Singh, 1988; Hennart and Larimo, 1998; Brouthers and Brouthers, 
2001), with results supporting the first hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2 anticipates a positive effect of acquirer’s R&D intensity level on the probability 
of choosing to fully acquire. Analyzing said hypothesis in Model 2, R&D intensity is shown to 
have a positive effect. Moreover, this effect is also statistically significant (p-value < 0,05). This 
coefficient can be read as the additional odds increase (exp(2,6996) =14,87 times) of opting for 
a full acquisition for each unit increase of R&D intensity level. This conclusion seems to be 
coherent with previous research (Kogut and Singh, 1988; Andersson et al, 1992; Brouthers and 
Brouthers, 2001). Therefore, there exists statistical evidence to support Hypothesis 2. 
Hypothesis 3 was tested in Model 3. It predicts that if the target and the acquirer are from the 
same industry, all other factors constant, a full acquisition is more probable to occur. Although 
the variable presents a positive coefficient, as expected, it is not statistically significant at a 95% 
confidence level (p-value = 0,0878). Hence, there is no statistical evidence to support 
Hypothesis 3. 
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Hypothesis 4 predicted a moderating effect of experience on the negative effect that cultural 
distance has on the probability of a firm performing a full acquisition. It can be seen in Model 
4 that, although the coefficient for the interaction between cultural distance and past acquisition 
experience is positive, and thus moderator of the negative effect of cultural distance, it is not 
statistically significant (p-value = 0,3164). 
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Table 1: Drivers of partial vs full acquisition 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
C 
3,4974 1,7188 1,8440 3,4816 1,6099 
0,0044 0,1164 0,0873 0,0041 0,0093 
Cultural Distance 
-0,0182   -0,0195 -0,0105 
0,0084     0,0059 0,0043 
R&D Intensity 
 2,6996   1,6367 
  0,0411     0,0200 
Same Industry 
  0,6681  0,2858 
    0,0878   0,1399 
Acquisition 
Experience 
1,2825 1,3879 1,3741 -0,6275 -0,1462 
0,2339 0,1479 0,1533 0,6858 0,8453 
Acquisition 
Experience * Cultural 
Distance 
   0,0375 0,0143 
      0,3164 0,4123 
Acquirer Size 
9,63E-06 -8,45E-06 -8,29E-06 -1,00E-05 -4,74E-06 
0,0026 0,0059 0,0067 0,0033 0,0028 
GDP per Capita 
2,03E-05 3,37E-05 3,62E-05 2,17E-05 1,21E-05 
0,0699 0,0026 0,0007 0,0577 0,0393 
Bilateral Trade 
7,81E-07 9,52E-07 9,41E-07 6,97E-07 3,18E-07 
0,6674 0,582 0,5801 0,693 0,7054 
Distance 
-4,00E-05 -4,11E-05 -4,14E-05 -3,40E-05 -1,44E-06 
0,5281 0,4426 0,4352 0,5942 0,9653 
Industry dummy 
----------------
- 
----------------
- 
----------------
- 
----------------
- 
----------------
- 
Time dummy 
----------------
- 
----------------
- 
----------------
- 
----------------
- 
----------------
- 
# observations 496 496 496 496 496 
McFadden R-squared 0,25980 0,25102 0,24675 0,26321 0,28437 
Estimated coefficients are in bold. P-values are presented below the coefficients, in italic. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics and Correlations of Independent Variables 
 
 
 
Variable Mean S.D.
Cultural 
distance
R&D intensity
Same 
industry
Acquisition 
experience
Acquirer size
Bilateral 
trade
GDP per 
capita
Distance
Cultural distance 50,747 28,5182 1
R&D intensity 0,2823 2,0621 0,02307443 1
Same industry 0,4052 0,4914 -0,0387066 -0,0426247 1
Acquisition experience 0,09879 0,3368 -0,0834256 -0,0239774 -0,0836846 1
Acquirer size 24325,7 52433,78 0,11906706 -0,0422315 -0,10956836 0,05890089 1
Bilateral trade 119714,7 154240,3 -0,304851 -0,0255683 0,04347817 0,00611869 -0,0605808 1
GDP per capita 37802,64 15443,51 -0,4308628 0,03087694 0,02345442 -0,0292514 -0,1899016 0,10864848 1
Distance 7128,329 3883,393 0,26055386 -0,0039727 -0,041217 -0,0216785 0,09257638 -0,6248335 -0,2670192 1
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IV. Discussion and Conclusions 
This study attempted to assess the main drivers that lead companies to choose for full against 
partial acquisitions in international M&A deals. Possible explanatory effects were derived, after 
an extent literature review. Across the existing literature, three main effects seemed to stand 
out. Firstly, the desire for less control entry modes as cultural differences increase. Secondly, 
that companies with higher levels of R&D intensity tend to feel more confident regarding to the 
management of the subsidiary, translating in the desire for more control. Thirdly, when 
acquiring in their own industry, firms opt for greater control stakes, as they already have the 
business “know-how”.  
The dependent variable for measuring the entry mode choice was chosen as a binary variable 
between partial and full acquisition, with the cutoff being 95% acquired stake. Moreover, and 
due to the nature of the dependent variable, the analysis was performed under various logistic 
models, investigating the effects of culture, R&D intensity, industry relatedness and previous 
acquisition experience on the choice to fully acquire. These interactions were investigating for 
a set of almost 500 US based firms’ international deals. 
Of these, the effects of cultural distance and R&D intensity proved to be statistically significant, 
corroborating Hypothesis 1 and 2 of this research, as opposed to the effects of industry 
relatedness and previous acquisition experience, for which there was a lack of statistical 
significance. Therefore, hypothesis 3 and 4 were refuted. Regarding industry relatedness, it can 
be that, as companies nowadays tend to diversify more, it gets more difficult to properly address 
and state that company X should be put under the label of said industry. Possible further 
research could be done by using a more complex index to better compare companies under the 
same industries. 
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Despite some of the positive results of this study, there are several limitations that must be 
considered, although these limitations also provide possibilities of further research. Firstly, this 
research only considers the decision of partial vs full acquisition, disregarding other entry 
modes such as greenfield investments and/or joint-ventures. This is because there was no free 
available data on greenfield investments or joint-ventures. Secondly, there is a strong bias in 
the sample towards full acquisitions. When collecting data, trying to end up with a homogenous 
sample was one of the main aspects considered. Nevertheless, when adding deals from other 
industries (more unrelated to the ones chosen and with a smaller number of deals) the overall 
percentage wouldn’t change significantly. Thirdly, it would be interesting, giving that a proper 
sample size exists, to compare the intensities in R&D of the buyer and acquired firms. As the 
sample was already controlled for publicly listed firms from the buyer side, adding the same 
condition to the target side would drastically reduce its numbers. Moreover, for some of the 
older acquisitions, lack of available information would produce the same effect. 
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